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The consequences of information differences across investors in capital markets are still much debated.
This paper examines the relation between information differences across investors and the cost of
capital, and makes three points. First, in models of perfect competition, information differences across
investors affect a firm’s cost of capital through investors’ average information precision, and not information
asymmetry per se. Second, the average precision effect of information that is heterogeneously distributed
across investors is unlikely to diversify away when there exist many firms whose cash flows covary.
Thus, better disclosure can reduce a firm’s cost of capital. Third, the precision effect does not give
rise to a separate information-risk factor. These points are important to empirical research in accounting
and finance, as well as to regulators who debate future disclosure requirements and the consequences
of prior requirements such as Regulation Fair Disclosure.
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Information diﬀerences across investors (or groups of investors) have been a long-
standing concern to securities regulators and at the core of U.S. disclosure regulation
(e.g., Loss, 1983; Loss and Seligman, 2001). For example, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) recently enacted Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which
intends to equalize information across investors by preventing companies from making
disclosures to select groups of investors and analysts. The SEC (2000) argued that
selective disclosure allows “those who were privy to the information beforehand...to
make a proﬁt or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept in the dark,” and that this
practice leads to a loss in investor conﬁdence (see also Levitt, 1998). Particularly,
small investors might be unwilling to invest if they fear that insiders gain at their
expense; this, in turn, increases ﬁrms’ cost of capital to the extent that the risk in
the economy has to be borne by fewer investors. Similarly, investors might demand a
return premium for investing in the capital markets or stocks that exhibit substantial
information asymmetry.1 Critics of Reg FD argued, however, that it could stiﬂe
corporate disclosure and, in turn, increase ﬁrms’ cost of capital (AIMR, 2001). For
example, SEC Commissioner Unger (2000) voted against the proposed regulation
because of concerns that it would “most likely reduce the amount of information
available to investors...and the quality of the information that would be produced.” As
this example shows, the consequences of information asymmetry in capital markets,
and, in particular, its relation to the amount and precision of information available
to investors and the cost of capital, are still much debated.
The issues of whether and how information diﬀerences across investors aﬀects
1 For evidence consistent with this notion see, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Chordia, et al.
(2000), and Easley, et al. (2002).
1prices and the cost of capital cannot be addressed in models of asset pricing that
assume that investors have homogeneous beliefs. Examples of such models are the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), but also a recent model by Lambert, et al.
(2007) used to study the eﬀect of accounting disclosure on the cost of capital. Stud-
ies that have developed models of capital market equilibria where investors have
heterogeneous information have reached diﬀerent conclusions regarding the eﬀects of
information on the cost of capital. For example, Leland (1992) ﬁnds that allowing
insider trading will, on average, increase stock prices despite the fact that the pres-
ence of insiders increases information asymmetry in the economy. Although he does
not couch his analysis in terms of cost of capital, higher stock prices on average are
tantamount to a decrease in ﬁrms’ cost of capital. In contrast, O’Hara (2003), Easley
and O’Hara (2004) and Hughes, et al. (2007)c o n c l u d et h a ti n f o r m a t i o na s y m m e t r y
increases ﬁrms’ cost of capital. Speciﬁcally, Easley and O’Hara (2004) analyze dif-
ferences in the composition of information between public and private information.
They argue that less informed traders recognize they are at an information disadvan-
tage, and hold fewer assets as a consequence. This drives down the price of securities
with high degrees of private information and hence information asymmetry, thereby
increasing the cost of capital for these ﬁrms. They conclude that “private information
thus induces a new form of systematic risk, and in equilibrium investors require com-
pensation for it.” Hughes, et al. (2007) argue that information asymmetries increase
cost of capital by increasing factor risk premiums. Wang (1993) ﬁnds that increasing
the percentage of informed investors in the economy lowers the cost of capital. As
Wang notes, the information structures he analyzes aﬀects both information asymme-
try and average precision. As such, Wang concludes that his results are attributable
to the joint eﬀect of both.
2Our paper explores the relation between information diﬀerences across investors,
information precision, and the cost of capital. Similar to Admati (1985), and in con-
trast to models of trade commonly found in the literature, we conduct our analysis
in an economy with multiple ﬁrms whose cash ﬂows covary. We deﬁne cost of capital
as the diﬀerence between beginning-of-period stock price and the expected end-of-
period cash ﬂow. We deﬁne average precision as the quality of investors’ information
about ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows on average, and measure information asymmetry based on
the diﬀerences in the quality, or precision, in information across investors.
We show that when capital markets are characterized by perfect competition
among investors (as all of the aforementioned models and many others assume),
equilibrium prices are a function of two features of the economy’s information struc-
ture only: 1) individual investors’ precision-weighted-average assessment of ﬁrms’
expected end-of-period cash ﬂows; and 2) their average, equilibrium precision matrix
(i.e., the inverse of the covariance matrix) of the distribution of ﬁrms’ end-of-period
cash ﬂows. The latter feature is the key determinant of the discount in prices relative
to the expected value of cash ﬂows. In other words, the expected return on a ﬁrm’s
stock price, and therefore its cost of capital, is directly related to investors’ average
precision matrix. The extent to which investors’ precision matrices deviate from this
average, however, does not matter. In particular, information asymmetry does not
aﬀect the discount for risk, holding average precision constant. This is true whether
information asymmetry is deﬁned in terms of investors’ equilibrium precisions (which
includes any inference they make from price) or in terms of their exogenous informa-
tion (i.e., their priors, public information, and private information).
Thus, we show that, in perfect competition models, there is no separate, system-
atic risk factor in price that stems from private information. Less informed investors
3choose to hold fewer shares in ﬁrms where their uncertainty is greatest, not where
information asymmetry is greatest. In fact, an investor’s degree of uncertainty de-
creases when other investors acquire more information (even when it is private),
because this information gets communicated (partially) through price when investors
condition their expectations over price in determining their demand (e.g., Grossman
and Stiglitz, 1980; Leland, 1992). We show that, as a result, increasing information
asymmetry actually decreases the ﬁrm’s cost of capital, as long as the change in
information structure increases average precision.
Another contribution of our paper is that it extends the analysis of informa-
tion diﬀerences on the cost of capital to a multiple-ﬁrm economy where ﬁrms’ cash
ﬂows covary. This allows us to make the distinction between diversiﬁable and non-
diversiﬁable risk, and to ask the important question of whether a ﬁrm can aﬀect its
cost of capital by disclosing additional information in large economies where investors
hold diversiﬁed portfolios. We extend two commonly used non-homogeneous infor-
mation structures in the extant rational expectations (RE) literature to a multi-ﬁrm
economy: one where investors have diverse information, as in Grossman (1976) and
Kim and Verrecchia (1991), and one where one group of investors has superior in-
formation to another group, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Easley and O’Hara
(2004) and Hughes, et al. (2007). We show that what matters in determining the
cost of capital in a multi-ﬁrm economy is the average precision matrix of information
across investors. Analogous to the CAPM, information diﬀerences across investors
that depend solely on the variance of a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows diversify away as the econ-
omy gets large. Thus, the oﬀ-diagonal elements of investors’ precision matrices play
a critical role toward ensuring that a ﬁrm’s cost of capital does not reduce to the
risk-free rate. We show that, with non-zero oﬀ-diagonal elements in the precision
4matrices, information disclosure by a ﬁrm reduces the discount for risk that investors
associate with holding shares in that ﬁrm. These results extend the estimation risk
literature (e.g., Brown, 1979; Barry and Brown, 1984, 1985) as well as recent work by
Lambert, et al. (2007), which assumes all investors have homogeneous information.
Aside from its theoretical contributions, our paper also has several important
implications for empirical studies. First, the paper shows that it is important to
distinguish between information asymmetry and information precision. A shift in
information asymmetry can appear to aﬀect the cost of capital, but this eﬀect may
occur because the average precision of information is changing simultaneously. Thus,
to isolate the eﬀect of information asymmetry, one has to control for changes in
information precision. That said, many changes to a ﬁrm’s information environment
(e.g., improved accounting standards, better disclosure, more analyst following, etc.)
that aﬀect the average precision in the economy are likely also to change the degree
of information asymmetry and vice versa. As a result, it is diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate
the eﬀects empirically. Thus, empirical studies should exercise care in choosing their
information constructs. It may also be interesting to explore the empirical relations
among various information proxies.2
Related to this point, our paper underscores the need to better understand the
potential trade-oﬀs between information-asymmetry eﬀects and precision eﬀects, for
instance, when mandating disclosure. As the debate about Reg FD illustrates, a
policy designed to decrease information asymmetry may result, as an unintended
consequence, in a decrease in the precision of publicly available information (or vice
versa). The presence of both eﬀects in real capital markets could explain why several
2 Along these lines, Verdi (2005) shows that many commonly used information proxies load onto
distinct factors in a principal factor analysis; this provides evidence consistent with the notion that
information asymmetry and average precision are distinct constructs.
5empirical studies point to an increase in ﬁrms’ cost of capital subsequent to Reg
FD (e.g., Duarte et al., 2006; Gomes et al., 2006), while others ﬁnd evidence for
a decrease (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2006). Similarly, the presence of precision and
information asymmetry eﬀects can explain the mixed eﬀects of various information
attributes on the cost of capital (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 2003; Botosan et al.,
2004; Francis et al., 2005; Verdi, 2005; Ogneva, 2008).
Finally, our paper contributes more broadly to the growing empirical literature on
the link between disclosure and the cost of capital, which is of considerable importance
to accounting and ﬁnance (see, e.g., surveys by Healy and Palepu, 2001, and Leuz
and Wysocki, 2008). Many of the studies in this literature implicitly or explicitly
treat information attributes (e.g., information asymmetry, information quality, etc.)
as a separate risk factor (e.g., Easley et al., 2002; Francis et al., 2005; Barth et al.,
2006; Duarte et al., 2006, Nichols 2006; Chen et al., 2007, Kravet and Shevlin, 2007;
Ogneva 2008). In doing so, these studies often refer to Easley and O’Hara (2004) as a
conceptual underpinning for their empirical analysis. Our paper shows that the eﬀects
in Easley and O’Hara (2004) do not give rise to an information risk factor and that
they are not attributable to information asymmetry. This result should be important
for the recent debates over whether accruals quality or the probability of informed
trade (or PIN), which is a commonly used measure for information asymmetry, are
priced in expected returns (e.g., Cohen, 2008; Core et al., 2008; Liu and Wysocki,
2007; Mohanram and Rajgopal, 2008). That said, our analysis does not preclude the
existence of information asymmetry eﬀects on ﬁrms’ cost of capital or the existence of
an information risk factor. For instance, such eﬀects could exist in models of imperfect
competition. Thus, empirical results that suggest or at least are consistent with a
factor interpretation ultimately call for more research on the eﬀects of information
6asymmetry on expected returns and the existence of an information risk factor (see
also O’Hara, 2003).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop
the model and derive pricing equations as a function of investors’ information struc-
tures. In section 3, we analyze speciﬁc information structures commonly used in the
literature to derive closed-form, pricing equations. Section 4 examines the issue of
diversiﬁabilty. We conclude with a brief summary.
2M a r k e t p r i c e s i n a m u l t i - ﬁrm economy
In this section we introduce a classical, one-period capital market setting in which N
investors, indexed by i =1 ,2,....,N, allocate their wealth over the shares of J ﬁrms
and a risk-free asset (e.g., bonds). These settings have a long tradition in ﬁnance,
and include traditional asset pricing models such as the CAPM (see Fama, 1976), as
well as RE-models (which we discuss in more detail below). Let ˜ V denote the J × 1
vector of end-of-period cash ﬂows generated by the ﬁrms, and ˜ Vj its j-th element,
and P the J × 1 vector of beginning-of-period market values, or prices, associated
with those ﬁrms, and Pj its j-th element.3 Each investor has information, represented
by Φi, upon which he forms beliefs about ﬁrms’ end-of-period cash ﬂows. We allow
for the possibility that Φi includes both public and private information, as well as
information inferred from the vector of market (equilibrium) prices, P. We assume
that investors assess the joint distribution of ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows to have a multivariate




represent investor i’s J×1
vector of ﬁrms’ expected values, and Covi investor i’s J × J covariance matrix of
3 Throughout our analysis we denote a random variable by a tilde (~), and the realization of a
random variable and/or a ﬁxed parameter with no tilde. In addition, we put vectors and matrices
in bold.
7ﬁrms’ end-of-period cash ﬂows, conditional on investor i’s information, Φi.B e l o w ,w e
discuss in greater detail the speciﬁc information that underlies investors’ beliefs. For
convenience, we represent the precision matrix for investor i’s beliefs by Πi,w h e r e
Πi is the inverse of covariance matrix investor i associates with ﬁrms’ end-of-period
cash ﬂows: that is, Πi = Cov
−1
i . Finally, let Π0 =
 N
i=1 Πi represent the sum of
investors’ precision matrices.
We assume that each of the N investors has a negative exponential utility func-
tion with a risk tolerance of parameter τ, and chooses his portfolio to maximize the
expected utility of his end-of-period wealth. Let ˆ Xi represent the J × 1 vector of
investor i’s endowment of ﬁrm shares, and ˆ Xij its j-th element, and ˆ Bi his endow-
ment of a risk-free asset (e.g., bonds). Similarly, let Xi represent the J × 1 vector
of investor i’s demand for ﬁrm shares, and Xij its j-th element, and Bi the units
of the risk-free asset he chooses to hold. We assume that the risk-free asset has an
initial price of $1,a n dy i e l d s1+Rf at the end of the period. Finally, for convenience
let ˜ X0 represent the J × 1 random vector of total supply of ﬁrm shares in the econ-






Conditional on a realization of the random supply vector, ˜ X0 = X0,w ec a n














 +Bi = ˆ XiP
 + ˆ Bi. Solving the budget constraint for the risk-free asset
implies setting Bi = ˆ XiP
 + ˆ Bi −XiP
 ; substituting this expression into the objective
4 While we explicitly include the dependence of investor i’s expected cash ﬂow on his information,
Φi, to save space we suppress this dependence in the expressions for the covariance and precision
matrices, Covi and Πi, respectively. We also suppress the dependency of price on the information
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. (2)
To derive an equilibrium set of prices, we sum the demands of all investors as
expressed in eqn. (2), and set them equal to the aggregate supply of shares in each
ﬁrm. This yields the following expression for the vector of equilibrium prices.













Eqn. (3) illustrates the aggregation property of price. Speciﬁcally, the vector of
market prices, P, is equal to: the vector of investors’ precision-weighted, average






nus a discount that results from the risk the market associates with holding ﬁrms’
shares, ( 1
NΠ0)−1 X0
Nτ; where both the average assessment of expected values and risk
are discounted back to the beginning-of-the-period at the risk-free rate, 1+Rf.I n -
vestors’ expected values are weighted by their precisions, Πi, because investors’ de-
mands are proportionate to their precisions, ceteris paribus. The risk associated with
holding ﬁrms’ shares, ( 1
NΠ0)−1 X0
Nτ, is a function of three elements: 1) the inverse of
investors’ average precision matrix for the distribution of ﬁrms’ end-of-period cash
ﬂows, ( 1
NΠ0)−1, as an expression of the (average) uncertainty associated with holding
ﬁrms’ shares; 2) the total supply of ﬁrm shares, X0, that investors are required to
9hold; and 3) the inverse of investors’ total tolerance for bearing risk, Nτ.5 Taking
expected values of eqn. (3) implies that the deviation of prices from the expected




deﬁne ﬁrm j’s cost of capital as the deviation of Pj from its ex-ante expected value;
that is, the cost of capital is equal to the j-th element of 1
1+Rf( 1
NΠ0)−1 E[˜ X0]
Nτ .T h i s
deﬁnition comports with the deﬁnition of others (e.g., Easley and O’Hara, 2004).
The salient feature of eqn. (3) is that the economy’s information structure aﬀects
the cost of capital of ﬁrms solely through its eﬀect on the inverse of investors’ average
precision matrix, 1
NΠ0. The precision matrix for investor i is simply the inverse of
the covariance matrix he associates with the cash ﬂows of all ﬁr m sb a s e do nh i si n f o r -
mation Φi. Inverting each investor’s covariance matrix, averaging these inverses, and
then inverting the average results in a matrix that is analogous to a covariance matrix.
Because of the non-linearities involved in matrix inversion, however, this covariance
matrix is not the simple average of investors’ individual covariance matrices.
Intuitively, a measure of information asymmetry should be related to the extent
to which investors’ precision matrices diﬀer from each other. But irrespective of how
information asymmetry is measured, eqn. (3) shows that the degree of information
asymmetry is irrelevant for pricing and the cost of capital, provided that one controls
for or holds investors’ average precision constant.
Note that the relevant metric for pricing is investors’ equilibrium precision ma-
trices; these matrices are conditional upon all available information, including any
information investors infer from prices. The notion that investors condition their
5 This last eﬀect is analogous to the one discussed in Merton (1987).
6 While each investor assesses the expected end-of-period cash ﬂows diﬀerently, their ex-ante ex-
pected values (prior to anyone receiving information) are equal to their prior, which we assume is
identical across investors. Similarly, we assume that investors have an identical distribution for the
liquidity shock, ˜ X0.
10expectations over price, and thereby glean additional information about ﬁrms’ cash
ﬂows through the price aggregation process, is the central tenet of the RE-literature
(e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Hellwig, 1980; Diamond and Verrecchia 1981;
Admati, 1985; etc.). When this is the case, price is also on the right-hand-side of
e q n . ( 3 )a sp a r to fΦi, e.g., it is one of the conditioning variable in the expecta-
tion and precision terms. In general, to solve the pricing equation in closed-form, a
RE-analysis requires that eqns. (1) and (3) be solved simultaneously, along with the
market-clearing condition that investors’ demand for ﬁrm shares equals the aggregate
supply of those shares.7 In section 3, we impose more structure on investors’ infor-
mation so as to solve the pricing equation in closed form. This also enables us to
relate parameters in the information structure to the average equilibrium precision
matrix, and therefore to the cost of capital.
One application of Proposition 1 that results in a closed-form solution occurs when
investors have homogeneous information. We represent homogeneous information by
ΦH:t h a ti s ,Φi = ΦH for all i.L e tΠH represent investors’ homogeneous precision
matrix, and CovH its inverse: that is, Πi = ΠH and CovH = Π
−1
H for all i.























When all investors have the same information, their beliefs are homogeneous and
hence there is no additional information to glean from price. Thus, Corollary 1 is a
closed-form solution for prices. The expression for prices in Corollary 1 is identical
7 If one were to ignore the possibility of investors conditioning their expectations on price by as-
suming that prices contained too much “noise,” then Proposition 1 oﬀers a representation for prices
that is analogous to the Lintner’s (1969) heterogeneous information version of the CAPM.
11to that in the CAPM (e.g., Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965).8 Speciﬁcally, the price of
each ﬁrm is equal to its expected end-of-period cash ﬂow, minus a discount for the
risk associated with holding that ﬁrm’s shares.9
3 Market prices with heterogeneous information
In this section we extend our analysis to heterogeneous information across investors in
conjunction with investors conditioning their expectations over price to study two in-
formation structures in the RE-literature: diverse information, as in Grossman (1976)
and Kim and Verrecchia (1991), and superior/inferior information, as in Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980), Easley and O’Hara (2004), and Hughes, et al. (2007). To be
able to solve for prices in closed-form, we assume the following information structure.
First, investors have a common prior over the distribution of the vector of end-of-
period cash ﬂows, ˜ V.L e tm represent the J ×1 vector of common prior beliefs about
the expected value of ˜ V,a n dmj its j-th element, and Ψ the J × J common prior
precision matrix of ˜ V. Note that in this formulation we allow for the cash ﬂows to
be correlated across ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm has associated with it a public announcement.
Let ˜ y represent the J × 1 vector of announcements, and ˜ yj its j-th element. We as-
sume that announcements have a normal distribution, where η represents the J × J
precision matrix of ˜ y.10 We assume that announcements are unbiased, but impose
no structure on η. For example, neither the variances across announcements, nor
8 The CAPM assumes that the supply vector, X0, is deterministic, and expresses investors’ demands
in terms of the percentage of ﬁrms’ shares held, so that the total supply sums to 1.











˜ Vj, ˜ Vk|ΦH
 
represents ﬁrm j’s contribution to the aggregate uncertainty investors





10It is straightforward to extend the model to allow for a vector of announcements about each ﬁrm,
or for each investor to observe a vector of private information about each ﬁrm.
12the covariances across pairs of announcements, need be identical. Each investor has
private information about each ﬁrm. Let ˜ zi represent the J ×1 vector of information
available to investor i,a n d˜ zij its j-th element. As with public announcements, we
assume that private information is unbiased and has a normal distribution. Let Si
represent investor i’s J ×J precision matrix for ˜ zi conditional on ˜ V = V.A si ss t a n -
dard practice in the literature, we assume that ˜ y and ˜ zi are independent conditional
on ˜ V = V.
We impose no structure on the precision matrix of private information Si:f o r
each investor the variance in private information can be diﬀerent across ﬁrms, and
Si can diﬀer across investors. In particular, this implies that investors need not
receive private information of equal quality. For example, some investors might not
be endowed with any private information, in which case Si is a J×J matrix of 0’s. In
fact, it is precisely this feature - how the quality of information diﬀe r sa c r o s si n v e s t o r s
- that we are interested in examining. As discussed above, information (both public
and private) is useful in investors’ demands for all ﬁrms. That is, public information
(say, earnings) for ﬁrm j will, in general, be useful for both revising the assessment
of expected end-of-period cash ﬂow for ﬁrm j and for other ﬁrms whose cash ﬂows
covary with ﬁrm j.
As is standard in the RE-literature, we prevent prices from being fully revealing
by assuming that the aggregate supply of ﬁrm shares is uncertain. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that the aggregate supply vector, ˜ X0, has a normal distribution. This implies
that prices, as information sources, incorporate noise in the form of an aggregate
supply shock. As is also the convention in the RE-literature, we couch our analysis
in the context of the distribution of the supply shock per-capita:t h a ti s ,i nt e r m so f
˜ x0,w h e r e˜ x0 represents the J × 1 vector of per-capita supply shocks, and ˜ x0j =
˜ X0j
N
13represents its j-th element. Note that the vector of per-capita supply shocks, ˜ x0,a l s o
has a normal distribution. Let ¯ x0 represent the J ×1 vector of expected values of ˜ x0,
where ¯ x0j represents its j-th element, and W the J × J precision matrix of ˜ x0.W e
assume that the distribution of ˜ x0 is independent of all other variables.
3.1 Diverse information
In Kim and Verrecchia (1991), the distribution of the private information, ˜ zi,c o n -
ditional on ˜ V = V, is independent across investors. In other words, each investor
observes a vector of information whose error terms can be correlated across ﬁrms,
but uncorrelated across investors. To start, as described above, each investor receives
a vector of private information, ˜ zi, where each vector has associated with it a con-
ditional precision matrix Si. As is standard in solving a RE-equilibrium, we assume
investors conjecture that the vector of prices has the following linear functional form:
˜ P = a+b˜ V+c˜ y−d˜ x0+e¯ x0. That is, investors conjecture that the price vector is a
linear function of vectors of true cash ﬂows, ˜ V, public announcements, ˜ y, and supply
shocks, ˜ x0 and ¯ x0,w h e r ea is a J × 1 vector of intercepts, and b, c, d,a n de are
J × J matrices of coeﬃc i e n t s .N o t et h a ti nt h i sf o r m u l a t i o nt h ep r i c eo fe a c hﬁrm is
allowed to be a function of the information about all other ﬁrms in the market. For
this same reason, the price of one ﬁrm also conveys information about other ﬁrms.
In particular, we describe the additional information investors infer by conditioning
their expectations over price as the “orthogonal” information in price. We represent
the orthogonal information in price with a variable ˜ u,w h e r e˜ u is deﬁned by
˜ u = b
−1
 
˜ P − a − c˜ y +( d − e)¯ x0
 
= ˜ V − b
−1d(˜ x0 − ¯ x0).
Note that b−1d is a J × J matrix. Conditional on ˜ V = V,t h ec o v a r i a n c em a -
trix for orthogonal information is b−1d · W−1 · (b−1d)
 . Finally, let θ represent
14the precision matrix for orthogonal information conditional on ˜ V = V:t h a t i s ,
θ =
 
b−1d · W−1 · (b−1d)
  −1
. Note that even though investors have diverse pri-
vate information, the precision of the orthogonal information (i.e., the incremental
information investors glean from price) is the same across investors.
In the context of this information structure, investor i’s expected value of ﬁrms’






i (Ψm + ηy + Sizi + θu),w h e r eΠi = Ψ+η+Si+θ
is the total equilibrium precision matrix of investor i. The total equilibrium precision
matrix consists of an investor’s prior, Ψ, the public announcements, η, his private
information, Si, and the orthogonal information from price, θ. The key insight here
is that when investor i conditions his expectations on his priors, public information,
private information, and price, the total precision of his information is simply the
sum of the precision matrices of his priors, the public announcements, his private
information, and the precision matrix of the orthogonalized price vector.
Let Avg [·]= 1
N
 N
i=1 [·] represent an averaging function across investors: for ex-
ample, recalling the deﬁnition of Π0 in Section 2, this implies that Avg [Πi]= 1
NΠ0.
Eqn. (3) identiﬁes the average precision of information across investors as the key
variable in determining the discount in prices; here, Avg [Πi]=Ψ+η+Avg [Si]+θ.
The only remaining task is to solve for θ, the precision matrix of the information
conveyed by price. To do this, we solve for the parameters b and d in the conjec-
tured functional form for price. Substituting the expected cash ﬂows and precisions
into the pricing eqn. (3) and summing across all investors gives us an equation for
prices. We equate the coeﬃcients from this equation with those from the conjectured
functional form to solve for the parameters b and d.
Recall that we deﬁne cost of capital as the deviation of prices from the expected
end-of-period cash ﬂows


















Avg [Πi]=Ψ + η + Avg [Si]+θ,
and the precision of the information conveyed by price is
θ = τ
2(Avg [Si]) · W · (Avg [Si])
 .
The contribution of Proposition 2 is that now we can solve in closed form the discount
in price relative to the expected end-of-period cash ﬂow that we ﬁrst characterized
in Proposition 1. Speciﬁcally, Proposition 2 conﬁrms that the discount in price is
governed by the average precision of information across investors. Moreover, note
that increasing the precision of private information for any subgroup of investors
(including groups who already possess above average precision) lowers cost of capital
b e c a u s ei ta ﬀects the average total precision in two mutually reinforcing ways: a direct
eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect through θ, the precision of the information conveyed
by price. When cash ﬂows, information, and liquidity shocks are all independently
distributed across ﬁrms, each ﬁrm is priced independently, and Proposition 2 reduces
to the same result found in Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991) single-ﬁrm analysis.
3.2 Superior information
In this section, we turn to the issue of information asymmetry and examine infor-
mation structures in which all investors are classiﬁed into two groups: those who get
private information and those who do not. The less-informed group consists of N1
16investors who only observe public information signals and price. We assume there
are Q1 public signals ˜ yh, h =1 ,...,Q 1, where each public signal is a J × 1 vector
of information announcements about the ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows, ˜ yh = ˜ V +˜ eh. For each
public signal, the vector of error terms ˜ eh has expected value of zero and a J × J
precision matrix denoted η. The individual precisions can diﬀer across ﬁrms and the
covariances of the error terms can be non-zero. The more informed group consists
of N2 = N − N1 investors who observe the Q1 vectors of public signals and also Q2
vectors of private signals, ˜ zk = ˜ V + ˜ ζk, k =1 ,...,Q2. In contrast to the prior sec-
tion, all investors in the more informed group observe exactly the same realization of
private signals. As with the public signals, we allow the precisions of the signals to
diﬀer across ﬁrms and the covariances in their error terms to be non-zero. Therefore a
public or private signal about one ﬁrm can convey information about the future cash
ﬂow of other ﬁrms. We assume that each of the vectors of public signals ˜ yh and each
of the vectors of private signals ˜ zk are conditionally independent of each other. Also
as before, each investor has a common prior on the distribution of the end-of-period
cash ﬂow, ˜ V; speciﬁcally, investors believe that ˜ V has a normal distribution with
mean m and precision Ψ.
The more informed group observes all public and private information available in
the economy. Hence, the more informed group cannot learn any additional informa-
tion from price. In eﬀect, for the more informed group, price is a redundant source
of information. Let ˜ Y =
 Q1
h=1 ˜ yh and ˜ Z =
 Q2
k=1˜ zk represent summary statistics for
the vectors of public and private signals, respectively. Conditional upon the realiza-
tion of public and private information (i.e., conditional on ˜ Y = Y and ˜ Z = Z), the





=[ Ψ + Q1η + Q2S]
−1 [Ψm + ηY + SZ],
17where the total precision matrix of their information is Π2 = Ψ + Q1η + Q2S.N o t e
that the total precision is increasing in the prior precision, Ψ, the precision matrices
per public and private signal, η and S, and the number of each type of signal, Q1
and Q2.
Members of the less informed group base their investment decisions on the Q1
public signals and price. As before, to ensure that price is not fully revealing, we
assume the shock to the aggregate supply creates noise. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
the aggregate per-capita supply for the ﬁrms can be represented by the J × 1 vector
˜ x0. Let ¯ x0 represent the J × 1 vector of expected values of ˜ x0,w h e r e¯ x0j represents
its j-th element, and W the J × J precision matrix of ˜ x0. We assume that the
distribution of ˜ x0 is independent of all other variables.
As in the previous subsection, a solution to a RE-equilibrium starts by requiring
that less informed investors conjecture that price is in the form ˜ P = a + b˜ Z + c˜ Y −
d˜ x0 + e¯ x0. Here we represent the orthogonal information in price with a variable ˜ u,




















(˜ x0 − ¯ x0).
As before, the orthogonal information in price represents the incremental information
less informed investors infer by conditioning their expectations on price. In our multi-
ﬁrm setting, the price of one ﬁrm can convey information not only about that ﬁrm’s
cash ﬂow, but also about the cash ﬂows of other ﬁrms. The presence of an aggregate
supply shock makes orthogonal information in price a noisy measure of the private
information available to more informed investors, ˜ Z.
Let θ denote the precision matrix that characterizes the error in ˜ u as a measure of
˜ V. As a consequence of conditioning their expectations on price, the total precision
18of investors in the less informed group is Π1 = Ψ+Q1η+θ.A sa b o v e ,Ψ represents
investors’ common prior precision matrix; similarly, Q1η is the precision matrix of the
public signals. While less informed investors have no private information, they glean
the private information of more informed investors (with noise) when they condition
their expectations on price. Here, θ represents the precision matrix of the additional
information less informed investors infer from price.
To solve the pricing equation in closed form and be able to calculate the average
equilibrium precision, we must calculate the precision of the information obtained
from price. This then allows the following characterization of the cost of capital.
Proposition 3. When cash ﬂows are cross-sectionally correlated, information aﬀects




















(Ψ + Q1η + θ)+
N2
N
(Ψ + Q1η + Q2S), (4)
























The ﬁrst term in eqn. (4) is the precision of less informed investors, weighted by their
relative population in the economy, N1
N , and the second term is the precision of more
informed investors, weighted by their relative population, N2
N .
The signiﬁcance of Proposition 3 is that it shows how our average precision result
extends to a superior-information structure with multiple ﬁrms. Average precision
governs the discount in price associated with the market holding ﬁrms’ shares. Thus,
as the expression for average precision in eqn. (4) goes up or down, cost of capital
correspondingly decreases or increases.
19To help analyze the determinants of average precision and to compare our results
to those in the literature, we consider the special case where all ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows,
information signals, and liquidity shocks are distributed independently across ﬁrms.
In this case, the average precision matrix is diagonal, and all ﬁrms are priced indepen-
dently.11 Therefore, our analysis becomes comparable to work that analyzes informa-
tion issues in a single-ﬁrm economy. In particular, we compare our results to those in
Easley and O’Hara (2004) (henceforth EOH), who also analyze the implications for
the cost of capital when some investors possess superior (private) information, but
emphasize the role of private information and information diﬀerences across investors
for their results. Thus, in the remainder of the section, we discusses the relation
between average information precision and information asymmetry.
To facilitate a comparison with EOH, we further specialize our results so that the
public and private signals have identical information properties. Let the precision of
the error terms in each of the private and public signals be denoted s (we drop the bold
notation to indicate we are now dealing with scalars). Moreover, to keep the notation
from getting too cumbersome, we do not include a subscript j to distinguish among
ﬁrms. Finally, we deﬁne the following terms to replicate notation used in EOH. Let
Q be the total number of information signals observed by more informed investors,
where Q ≡ Q1 + Q2,a n dα be the percentage of all signals that are private (i.e.,
α =
Q2
Q1+Q2). The fraction of investors in the informed group is μ,w h e r eμ = N2
N1+N2.





(Ψ + Q1s + θ)+
N2
N
(Ψ +( Q1 + Q2)s)
11In the next section we consider the aﬀect of non-zero correlations across ﬁrms and non-zero oﬀ-
diagonal elements of the average precision matrix.
20= Ψ +( 1− α)Qs + μαQs +( 1− μ)θ, (5a)

















Eqns. (5a) and (5b) are identical to the cost of capital equations in EOH. The
closed-form solution for the cost of capital shows that it depends on the average
precision of the two groups. The weights are the percentage of investors in each
group: μ for the informed group, and 1−μ for the less informed group. The relevant
metric for pricing is investors’ total average equilibrium precision, which includes
the inference the less informed group makes from price, and not the diﬀerences in
investors’ precision matrices.
Next we turn to comparative statics on the cost of capital.
Corollary 2. The cost of capital is decreasing in the following:
a) 1−α, t h ep e r c e n t a g eo fs i g n a l st h a ta r ep u b l i c( h o l d i n gc o n s t a n tt h et o t a ln u m b e r
of signals);
b) μ, the percentage of investors that are informed;
c) Q1s, the total precision of the public signals available to both groups (holding
Q2 constant);
d) Q2s, the total precision of the private signals available only to the more informed
group (holding Q1 constant).
Each of these parameter changes results in an increase in the average equilibrium
precision of investors in the economy; hence, cost of capital decreases. In cases (a),
(c), and (d), the precision of information for at least one group increases, and no
group has their precision decrease. In case (b), investors are transferred from the
lower precision group to the higher precision group. This obviously increases the
21precision of their information, leaves unchanged the precision of the investors already
in the informed group, and increases the precision of the investors remaining in the
less informed group. The latter result occurs because price becomes more informative.
EOH derive results analogous to the ﬁrst two results in Corollary 2, but interpret
the cause as arising from changes in the composition of private and public informa-
tion and hence the asymmetry of signals across investors.12 To illustrate why these
interpretations are diﬀerent, we oﬀer a measure of information asymmetry and then
revisit our comparative statics in light of this measure. Because there are only two
groups, and each investor within each group observes identical information-signal re-
alizations, informed asymmetry could be measured simply as the diﬀerence between
the two groups’ precisions of information, Π2−Π1. A shortcoming with this approach,
however, is that it fails to reﬂect changes that occur to the composition of the two
groups, such as in result (b) above. Thus, we measure information asymmetry as the
variance of the precisions across the investors in the economy. Speciﬁcally, let IA(·)
be a computation of the variance in investors’ precisions; when there are only two







2 = μ(1 − μ)(αQs − θ)
2.
In short, our measure of information asymmetry is the product of the proportions of
investors in each group and the square of the diﬀerence in their precisions.
Employing this measure of information asymmetry, it is a straightforward exercise
to show that as the percentage of signals that are public increases as in case (a) above,
information asymmetry and average precision move in concert. For the remaining
12Yet, the second expression for the average precision in eqn. (5a) is identical to the expression that
appears in EOH’s pricing equation in their Proposition 2. EOH choose a parameterization where
the total information content of the signals is held constant but the composition changes. Despite
this parameterization, the average equilibrium precision changes and this is what drives the results.
22three results in Corollary 2, however, information asymmetry and average precision
do not move in concert, making it easier to distinguish their eﬀects. In case (b),
information asymmetry is a non-monotonic function of μ, the percentage of investors
in the informed group. Information asymmetry is zero at the two extremes, when
all investors are in either the informed group or the uninformed group. In case (d),
providing more information to the informed group obviously increases their precision.
This also indirectly increases the precision of the information of the uninformed group
because prices are more informative. Despite the fact that prices transmit information
with noise, the precision of information for the less informed group does not increase
as quickly as the precision of information for the more informed group. As a result,
information asymmetry between the two groups increases.
T h e s ec a s e si l l u s t r a t et h a ti ti sn o ti n f o r m a t i o na s y m m e t r y ,b u tt h ea v e r a g ep r e -
cision that determines the eﬀect on the cost of capital. Once one controls for average
precision, information asymmetry has no eﬀect on the cost of capital. There are some
circumstances where reducing information asymmetry can appear to reduce cost of
capital, e.g., case (a). Note, however, that the reason why providing less informed
investors access to information previously available only to more informed investors
reduces cost of capital is because the average precision of investors’ information in-
creases, not because information asymmetry decreases. In contrast, an attempt to
reduce information asymmetry by limiting informed investors’ access to more informa-
tion increases cost of capital because investors’ average precision is lower. Therefore,
attempts at “level the playing ﬁeld” by providing all investors with the same informa-
tion have an ambiguous eﬀect on the cost of capital. If the playing ﬁeld is “leveled”
by increasing the information available to the less informed group, cost of capital goes
down. If the playing ﬁeld is leveled by restricting the ability of informed investors to
23acquire additional private signals, then cost of capital will rise. In summary, the com-
munication of more information to more investors, not the reduction of information
asymmetry per se, lowers cost of capital.
4 Disclosure and diversiﬁcation
Section 3 establishes that the discount the market associates with holding ﬁrms’
shares relies on investors’ average precision matrix for the distribution of ﬁrms’ end-
of-period cash ﬂows. In this section we address whether an individual ﬁrm can aﬀect
its discount by disclosing additional information about its cash ﬂow. Recall that
we deﬁne cost of capital as 1
1+Rf( 1
NΠ0)−1 E[˜ X0]
Nτ . It is straightforward to show that
when there are only a ﬁnite number of investors in the economy (i.e., N is ﬁnite),
additional disclosure by ﬁrm j will reduce its discount by increasing the average
precision in investors’ information, 1
NΠ0. Such an eﬀect will occur even if ﬁrms’ cash
ﬂows are viewed to be independently distributed. Nonetheless, it could be argued
that the ﬁnite-N case is uninteresting in the context of the CAPM in that it fails
to capture the eﬀect of diversiﬁcation. Thus, in this section we study the eﬀect of
disclosure by ﬁrm j on its discount in the presence of diversiﬁcation.
Diversiﬁcation is achieved typically by appealing to the notion of a large economy.
So as to avoid cases as uninteresting as the ﬁnite-N case, however, some consideration
should be given to how one deﬁnes a “large economy.” For example, if by “large econ-
omy” one means that the number of investors in the economy gets large (i.e., N gets
large), while all other features of the economy remain ﬁnite, then diversiﬁcation alone
eliminates any discount because
E[˜ X0]
Nτ approaches 0. Therefore, to be economically
interesting, we deﬁne a “large economy” as one in which both the number of investors,
N, and the number of ﬁrms, J, become large (see also Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert
24et al., 2007). That is, each ﬁrm remains ﬁnite, but the number of ﬁrms increases.
To illustrate how an individual ﬁrm can aﬀect its discount, we consider the case
where all investors have the same precision of information, but the information itself
is diverse: that is, we assume Πi = ΠΩ and Covi = CovΩ for all i. Here, it is
straightforward to show that ﬁrms’ cost of capital is proportional to CovΩ
E[˜ X0]
Nτ .


























where Covj,k represents the j-th, k-th element of the matrix CovΩ. The right-hand-
side of eqn. (6) is analogous to the discount for risk in the traditional CAPM, except
in our analysis the covariances are multiplied by the expected supply of ﬁrms’ shares;
in the CAPM, the expected supply of ﬁrms’ shares (in percentage terms) is 1.I f
the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix CovΩ are zero, the left-hand-side





. This expression approaches 0 as N gets
large. This is consistent with the concept of “diversiﬁable risk.” Thus, here the
average precision of investors’ information is irrelevant; as such, any disclosure by
ﬁrm j intended to aﬀect the average precision is also irrelevant.13 If the oﬀ-diagonal






will grow as the number of ﬁrms








0.I ns h o r t ,f o rﬁrm j’s cost of capital to remain positive in a large economy (as we
have deﬁned it), ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows must covary.
When ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows covary and the error in ﬁrm j’s disclosure is independent
of all other variables, the following result holds.
13This implies that the information eﬀects in EOH are diversiﬁable. Hughes, et al. (2007) raise a
similar point about EOH. However, like EOH, they cast the eﬀects in their model as being driven
by information asymmetry, when in fact they are precision eﬀects.Thus, our results on the role of
information precision apply equally to Hughes, et al. (2007).
25Proposition 4. When all investors have the same precision of information, but the
information itself is diverse, and the error in ﬁrm j’s disclosure is independent of
all other variables, ﬁrm j’s cost of capital moves closer to the risk free rate as the
precision in its disclosure about its cash ﬂow increases.
Proposition 4 demonstrates that disclosure by a ﬁrm attenuates the discount for the
risk the market associates with holding shares of that ﬁr m ,e v e nw h e nt h eq u a l i t y
of its disclosure is idiosyncratic (i.e., independent of all other variables). This result
extends the estimation risk literature (e.g., Brown, 1979; Barry and Brown, 1984 and
1985), which analyzes information structures that are identical across investors based
on the historical time-series of returns from a stationary process, but has diﬃculty in
signing the eﬀects of information diﬀerences across ﬁrms. It also extends recent work
on the role of accounting information for ﬁrms’ estimation risk by Lambert, et al.
(2007), which is conﬁned to a CAPM setting with homogeneous information among
investors.
Similarly, in the superior information scenario, if the oﬀ-diagonal terms of the in-
vestors’ covariance matrices are zero, this will also be true in their precision matrices,
and in the average precision matrix. As a result, the cost of capital for ﬁrm j will be
will equal to the average precision for that ﬁrm times the expected supply of ﬁrm j
shares per-capita. Because the expected number of shares for ﬁrm j remains constant
as the economy as a whole grows, the expected supply per-capita goes to zero. Since
the average precision will be bounded, this implies the cost of capital will approach
zero. Again, this shows that it is the oﬀ-diagonal terms in investors’ covariance and
precision matrices that are critical in determining the ﬁrm’s cost of capital.
265C o n c l u s i o n
This paper examines how the distribution of information across investors aﬀects ﬁrms’
cost of capital in a rational expectations (RE) economy with perfect competition. In
contrast to models commonly found in the RE-literature, we consider an economy
with multiple ﬁrms whose cash ﬂows are correlated. We ﬁnd that when investors
have diﬀerent information, prices are a function of two features of the economy’s
information structure: 1) the precision-weighted average of individual investors’ vec-
tor of expected end-of-period cash ﬂows; and 2) the average of investors’ precision
matrices of the distribution of ﬁrms’ end-of-period cash ﬂows.
The latter feature determines the discount in prices relative to ﬁrms’ expected
cash ﬂows. That is, the average of investors’ precisions (including any inferences they
glean from price) is a primary determinant of cost of capital. No other attribute
of investors’ information is relevant to ﬁrms’ cost of capital. In particular, once one
controls for average precision, the extent of information asymmetry in the economy
(which we measure by the diﬀerence in individual investors’ precision matrices rela-
tive to the average precision matrix) has no eﬀect on the cost of capital. Reducing
information asymmetry can appear to lower cost of capital in some situations by pro-
viding less informed investors access to information previously available only to better
informed investors. In this case, however, the cost of capital decreases because the
average precision of investors’ information increases, not because information asym-
metry decreases. In other words, the communication of more information to more
investors, not the reduction of information asymmetry, lowers cost of capital. Con-
versely, attempts at “level the playing ﬁeld” by restricting the ability of informed
investors to acquire additional information will increase ﬁrms’ cost of capital. This
27contrasts with the leveling eﬀect on the cost of capital by increasing the information
available to the less-informed group described earlier.
Why are prices not lower for ﬁrms where less informed investors face greater in-
formation disadvantages? We believe the critical feature of the model that drives
this result is that the markets are characterized by perfect competition across in-
vestors. Perfect competition is a standard feature of many asset pricing models,
including those commonly found in the RE-literature. Under perfect competition,
each investor’s demand for the shares of ﬁrm is decreasing in his assessed degree of
uncertainty (increasing in his assessed precision) about that ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂow.
While less informed investors demand fewer shares when they perceive uncertainty to
be high, more informed investors demand more shares. Because demand is linear in
each investor’s precision, the relevant metric when investors’ demands are aggregated
to clear the market is the average precision.
Moreover, the assessed uncertainty about a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow (or the discount for
risk) is not greater when the investor perceives that other investors possess more
precise information. In fact, an investor’s degree of uncertainty decreases when other
investors acquire more information, because this information becomes (partially) com-
municated through price when investors condition their expectations over price in
determining their demand. As each investor determines his demand for ﬁrm shares
based on a conjecture that his demand cannot aﬀect price, more informed investors
do not reduce their demand strategically for fear of revealing their information to
others. More importantly, no trading takes place until an equilibrium price is set.
Less informed investors can transact any quantity at this market clearing price. In
addition, they are able to use price as a conditioning variable in setting their expec-
tations and assessing risk when they submit their demand order. Thus, with perfect
28competition, information asymmetry does not result in adverse selection and there is
no compensation for being less informed.
The fact that the average of investors’ precisions is a primary determinant of cost
of capital should not be interpreted as suggesting that information asymmetry’s role
in welfare is benign. It should be clear that when better informed investors participate
in the economy, they will achieve a higher expected utility than less well informed
investors (ceteris paribus ). But cost of capital and welfare are distinct phenomena;
as such they need not comport with one another (see, e.g., Gao, 2008).
In addition, the fact that the average of investors’ precisions is a primary determi-
nant of cost of capital in a setting of perfect competition should not be interpreted as
suggesting that information asymmetry cannot play a role in other economic settings.
In particular, a natural avenue for future research is to examine the role of informa-
tion asymmetry in imperfect competition settings. For example, Copeland and Galai
(1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) poin to u tt h a ta s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o nc a n
exacerbate adverse selection, thereby leading to higher bid-ask spreads.14 Closer in
spirit to our analysis, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) examine a single-ﬁrm, imper-
fect competition setting comprised of informed traders, uninformed market makers
(or investors), and liquidity traders. They ﬁnd that large, risk neutral traders are
unwilling to all hold shares in the economy because they anticipate an adverse selec-
tion problem in secondary-share markets: in other words, if they are required to sell
their shares in response to a liquidity shock, they risk being confused with informed
traders who sell in response to unfavorable information. As information asymmetry
in the secondary market increases, large traders choose to hold fewer shares; this,
in turn, increases the risk that must be borne by small investors, and hence lowers
14See also Kyle (1985, 1989) and Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988).
29the equilibrium price of the ﬁrm. Equivalently, the ﬁrm’s cost of capital rises. This
suggests a path for future research: combining the variety of information structures
analyzed here with imperfect competition settings to study how (or whether) average
precision and information asymmetry interact in determining a ﬁrm’s cost of capital.
30APPENDIX
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
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Thus, when investors condition their expectations over P, they interpret P as a
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31where for convenience we now express the aggregate supply on a per-capita basis:
that is, ˜ x0 =
˜ X0
N . The law of large numbers implies that 1
N
 N




i=1 Si˜ V because the idiosyncratic elements in ˜ zi average out. Thus, we substitute
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Now recall that investors conjecture that ˜ P is of the form ˜ P = a+b˜ V+c˜ y−d˜ x0+e¯ x0.






































































Substituting this expression for b−1d back into the expression for the precision of the




















32P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
The average precision of investors’ information is N1
N (Ψ + Q1η + θ)+N2
N (Ψ + Q1η + Q2S).
It remains to solve for θ, the precision of the incremental information provided by























−1 [Ψm + ηY + θu]=[ Ψm + ηY + θu].





−1 [Ψm + ηY + SZ]=[ Ψm + ηY + SZ].
























Substituting ˜ u = b−1
Q2
 












(N1 + N2)[Ψm + ηY]+N1θ







































But recall once again that price is also equal to P = a + b˜ Z + c˜ Y + dx0 − e¯ x0.

























where N ≡ N1 + N2. This implies that the covariance matrix of ˜ u,t h ee r r o ri nt h e



























33The precision matrix θ is the inverse of this expression. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Recall that the cost of capital is decreasing in Avg [Π], where












































































Therefore, Avg [Π] is decreasing in α,w h i c hm a k e si ti n c r e a s i n gi n(1 − α).
b. The fact that the private information of informed investors is more precise than the
less informed investors’ imperfect inference of their information through price implies
αQs − θ > 0. It is also straightforward to show ∂θ
∂μ > 0. Together these imply
∂Avg [Π]
∂μ







d. Note that ∂θ













P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
Let Π represent investors’ homogeneous, total precision matrix. From the proof to
Proposition 2, we know that investors’ precision is additive in the precision of public
information about ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows (additive in η). Without loss of generality, assume
that ﬁrm 1 discloses additional information about its cash ﬂow with error ˜ δ,a n d˜ δ
is independent of all other variables. Let Π∗ represent investors’ homogeneous, total
precision matrix that results from ﬁrm 1’s additional disclosure, and Cov
∗ its inverse:
that is, Cov
∗ = Π∗−1.W i t hﬁrm 1’s additional disclosure, investors’ precision matrix
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Cofactorj,1 of Π matrix
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